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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: BABY DOE,
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SYLVESTER ENO-IDEM

]>
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ON APPEAL

]

vs.

]i

Priority 7

JOHN AND MARY DOE,

]1

Case No. 870476-CA

Respondents.

]

RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents agree with Appellant's statement of the case
except as to the facts set forth hereunder:
1.

The

natural father (appellant) returned to Nigeria due

to his employment and to further his education

(Petitioner's

Exhibit "A", paragraph 4, appellant's brief),
2.

The natural father and mother were involved in a brief

relationship near the first part of October 198 5 which culminated
in a single act of intercourse.(Emphasis supplied)

The natural

mother was married, although separated, at the time of conception
and did not intend to marry the natural father.

Within a few

days after said act of intercouse, appellant left the State of

1

Utah and the United States and the natural m<pther had no contact
with him from October 1985 until he returned! in November 1986.
She was unaware of his whereabouts during said period of time.
(See Addendum, Deposition and Consent To Adaption, paragraph 3,
TAB 1# hereinafter referred to as TAB 1 ) .
3.

During the time appellant resided iri Nigeria, he did not

contact the natural mother, nor inform her of his address or
telephone number, or any way that she could contact him. (
Exhibit "A", paragraph 5, appellant's brief)J
4.

At the time of appellant's return po the United States

in November 1986, he was newly married,and lust had a son of his
own (ostensibly in Nigeria), (See Addendum! letter of natural
mother dated 12/16/86, TAB 2ihereinafter referred to as TAB 2 ) .
5.

The natural father did not contact respondents' counsel

to express that he wanted the child and did hot want the adoption
to proceed until February 13, 1987, more than three weeks after
the adoption was finalized on January 21, 1987. (Record, pages
52-5 3, hereinafter referred to as R.pp. 52-51:3)
6.

The sole contact by appellant with) respondents' counsel

prior to finalization of the subject adoption was a letter from
the natural mother dated 12/16/86, advising that both she and
appellant agreed with the subject adoption ^nd felt it was in the
best interests of the child but expressed a desire to see the

2

child to be assured that all was well. (TAB 2, R.pp. 37,52-53).
7.

The

natural mother was not aware that she was pregnant

until sometime after she had

conceived.

She was unable to

contact appellant because he was out of the country and she had
no way to contact him. (See Addendum, Transcript of October 2,
1987 hearing, page 3, TAB 3 i hereinafter referred to as TAB 3.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT I
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT
APPELLANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
It was not impossible for appellant [to file
the required paternity notice througth no fault of
his own.

B.

Due process does not require actual notice to an unwed
father before his rights may be terminated.

C.

78-30-4(3) U.C.A. is constitutional and does not violate
due process as applied to the factIs of the instant
appeal.

D.

The exceptions to the statutory cutorr as reflected in
the Ellis & Baby Boy Doe cases hav^ no application to
this case.

POINT II

APPELLANT HAS NO EQUITABLE RIGHT TO HIS CHILD WHICH
TRANSCENDS THE STATES' INTEREST IN SPEEDILY IDENTIFYING
ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SECURELY CONCLUDING
ADOPTIONS.
±,

POINT III THE BEST INTERESTS OF BABY BOY DOE WILL BE SERVED BY
HIM REMAINING WITH HIS ADOPTIVE PARENTS.
POINT IV

78-30-14(7) U.C.A. DOES NOT EXPAND THE TIME SET FORTH
IN 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM OF
PATERNITY.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT
APPELLANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
The appellant urges at some length that his circumstances
fall within the parameters of the case of Ellis v Social Services
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
615 P2d 1250 (Utah 1980).

He argues, therefore, that he should

be afforded a reasonable opportunity i.e. an evidentiary hearing
to show that is was impossible for him to file the required
statutory notice through no fault of his own and that he came
forth within a reasonable time and did file his notice
paternity.
Society,

(Emphasis

681

P2d 199

supplied)

of

In Wells v Childrens* Aid

(Utah 1984),

the court, citing Ellis

extended the "reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute"
after the statutory filing deadlines had passed, only in cases
"when it is first shown that it was 'impossible1 for the father
to file* through no fault of his own1 Id.at 207-08).
Surely, appellant, who is a college educated Nigerian and
has attended Weber State College in Ogden, Utah, must be presumed
to know that sexual intercourse may result in conception and the
ultimate birth of a child.

His acknowledged statement, that

during a 13 month absence from the United States and the natural
mother with whom he claimed he was involved in an 8 month love
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affair to whom he was strongly bonded and w|th whom he intended
to resume his relationship upon his return, yet he had absolutely
no contact with her, neither did he furnish ljier with his address
or telephone number or any way to contact piim, (Exhibit

"A",

paragraphs 4, 5, & 6, and p.4 appellant's br lef), cannot justify
his claim that is was impossible for him tlo file the required
notice

through

no

fault of his own

(emphasis

supplied).

Appellant claims that when the natural mother learned of her
pregnancy, she attempted to contact him but was unable to do so.
(See Addendum, Transcript of October 2, lj987 hearing TAB 3,
hereinafter referred to as

TAB 3 ) .

Had appellant, in fact, maintained the [close relationship
which he claimed existed with the natural mpther, he would have
provided her with his address and phone number and she could have
notified him upon learning of her pregnancy,
to

appellant's

own

fault

(emphasis

notification could not be made.

Clearly, it was due

sd]pplied)

that

such

Accordingly, appellant should

not be allowed an evidentiary hearing to stjow that he did not
have a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute,
Appellant next contends that he was not afforded due process
in that he was not notified of the subject] adoption proceeding
nor of the birth of his child.

In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court

cited with approval the United States Supreme Court case of Lehr
v Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) which dealt with a New York
statute containing similar filing requirements as the Utah
6

statute.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that an

unwed father was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings
and held that he must comply with the filing requirements of the
New York statute.

The court, in Wells, specifically stated:

"...due process does not require that the father of an
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before
his parental rights can be terminated..." Id. at 213.
If, in fact, the requirement of due process articulated in
Ellis and In Re Adoption of Baby Doe 717 P2d 686 (Utah 1986),
required actual notice of either the birth of the child, the
statutory filing requirements or the adoption proceeding itself,
to an unwed father before his failure to file an acknowledgement
of paternity would constitute a bar, the adoptive processes of
the state would be totally chaotic.

It would mean, in a case

such as this, that any time a "one night stand" occurred and the
unwed father was unaware that the act of intercourse had resulted
in conception, he could come back at any time, three months, six
months, or even six years later and disrupt

and void

the

adoption process that had occurred soon after the birth of the
child.

A similar claim could be made if he were unaware of the

statutory requirement or the adoption proceeding itself.

It is

submitted that such an interpretation was never contemplated by
the legislature in its adoption of the Utah statute.
A comprehensive treatment of the state of the law in Utah
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regarding adoptions is contained in the article, The Adoption
Conundrum, Part 1# Utah Lawyer Alert, Vol. 87L No. 4.
Addendum, TAB 3

(See

hereinafter referred to ap TAB 3 ) •

Therein,

Professor Lynn Wardle of the Brigham Young University Law School
analyses the statutory notice filing requirements of 78-30-4(3)
U.C.A. in light of four recent Utah Suprem|e Court cases

i.e.

Ellis, supra, Wells, supra, Baby Boy Doe, sutira, Sanchez v L.D.S
Social Services, 680 P2d 753 (Utah 1984).
held

that

78-30-4(3) U.C.A.,

All four cases have

requiring! the

filing of an

acknowledgement of paternity prior to the petition for adoption
being filed by adoptive parents is constitutional and valid.

In

Wells and Sanchez, the Court held that unwed fathers had not
complied with the statute, however, the Requirements of due
process had been met.

In the cases of Ellis and Baby Boy Doe,

the Court, in essence, held that the statute Iviolated due process
as applied, and remanded the cases for evidentiary hearings.
In an effort to assist judges and attorneys in determining
which cases fall within the Ellis and Baby B<W Doe

exceptions to

the strict statutory requirements of 78-30-4(3) U.C.A., Professor
Wardle cites four common threads running through those two
decisions.

(1)

There was deceit or misconduct by the mother or

her agents at a critical time which prejudiced the ability of the
unwed father to comply with the notice-filing requirement.

(2)

In both cases, the child was conceived out of Utah by non-Utah
residents and the mother came to Utah shortl^ before giving
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birth.

(3)

The putative fathers registered their claim of

paternity immediately upon learning of the statutory requirement.
(4)

Such registration occurred within a few days after the child

was released for adoption.

None of the four criterion mentioned

above apply to the subject case.
(1)

There was no deceit or misconduct on behalf of the

natural mother.

The pregnancy resulted from a single act of

intercourse and within a few days thereafter appellant left the
United States with his whereabouts unknown.

(paragraph 3, TAB 1)

In the Ellis and Doe cases, there was an ongoing relationship
between the parties wherein they had lived together for a period
of time and marriage had been contemplated in both cases.
there was no such ongoing relationship.

Here,

Appellant's claim that

he was involved in a love affair with the natural mother

for

approximately 8 months and that they had developed a strong,
bonded relationship which he intended to resume upon his return
to the United States,(Exhibit

"A", paragraphs 4 & 6 & p.4,

appellant's brief), is expressly contradicted by the natural
mother.

Therein, she stated that in the first part of October,

1985, she became involved in a brief relationship with appellant
which resulted in a single act of intercourse.

(See paragraph 3,

TAB 1 ) . Furthermore, his claim of a strong, bonded relationship
is inconsistent with his admission that at no time during his
9

absence from the natural mother (approximately 13 months) did he
contact the natural mother or inform her of his address or
telephone number or any way to contact him,
paragraph 5, appellant's brief)

( Exhibit "A",

Rather his total lack of contact

or communication with the natural mother is consistent with his
new marriage and fathering a child during hisj absence in Nigeria.
(See Addendum, TAB 2 ) .
(2)

The child in the subject case was Conceived in Utah by

the natural mother who was a Utah resident and by the appellant
who resided in Utah at the time of conception and then left the
United States voluntarily,
(3)

The subject case is clearly distirict from the Doe and

Ellis cases.

In Doe the putative father learned of the filing of

an adoption petition on August 28th, one day after the petition
had been filed on August 27th.

He immediately contacted a

lawyer, drove from Arizona to the State of Utah and filed a
Notice of Claim of Paternity on August 20th.

In Ellis, the

putative father learned of the filing of the petition
adoption within a day or two of its filiAg.

for

Thereafter, his

attorney contacted the adoption agency in Utah on December 21st,
and the Notice of Claim of Paternity was filed approximately 10
days later on January 2nd.

By contrast, the appellant in this

case learned of the birth of his child in November, 1986,
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concurred in its placement for adoption as reflected in the
letter from the natural mother to counsel for respondents dated
12/16/86 (TAB 2 ) , and did not file a Notice of Acknowledgement of
Paternity until January 13, 198 7, approximately two months after
learning he was the father of the child.

While

appellant

atteinpted to justify the lengthy delay between his knowledge of
the birth of his child and the filing of the Notice of Claim to
Paternity on the basis that he needed to confer and consult with
his family in Nigeria and determine their wishes, the decision to
assert such a claim was solely his as the natural father.

Also,

appellant's claim in paragraph 11 of Exhibit "A" in appellant's
brief that it took several weeks for his family in Nigeria to
respond to his consultations with them is inappropriate and
should not be considered by the court inasmuch as said claim is
raised for the first time on appeal.

Nowhere in the previous

pleadings filed in this matter with the court, has appellant
contended

that the delay in filing the Notice of Claim to

Paternity resulted in any manner from any political or economic
unrest in Nigeria. (See Statement of Facts, appellant's brief
pages 3-5,; TAB 3) .
(4)

The registration of the acknowledgement of paternity

did not occur within a few days after the child was released for
adoption, but approximately 6 months later and approximately two

11

months after appellant knew of the birth of his child.
The recent cases of K.B.E, In Re:,740 P2d 292 (Utah 1987)
and K.O. v Denison, 748 P2d 588 (Utah 1988) decided by the Utah
Court of Appeals are clearly distinguishable from the subject
case.

In K.B.E. the natural mother and her grandfather filed a

petition for adoption on August 26th 1985 the morning of T.M.E.'s
birth.

The child's father filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity

during the afternoon of the same day, after learning of the
child's birth.

There, the court held that the statute as applied

violated due process.

An evidentiary hearing was not deemed

necessary inasmuch as the natural mother was not voluntarily
terminating her parental relationship to place the child with new
parents.

Rather, she petitioned for joint custody for herself

and her grandfather.

In addition, the natural father filed his

Acknowledgement of Paternity within
Petition for Adoption.

just a few hours of the

In the subject case, by contrast, the

natural mother did relinquish her parental rights within two days
of the birth of the child, said child w^s placed with the
respondents (the adoptive parents), the adoption was finalized on
January 21, 1987, and the adoptive parents and the child have
continuously resided together and bonded as a family unit for
approximately

22 months.

Also, in the subject case, the

appellant did not file his Acknowledgement of Paternity within a
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few hours

of

the filing of the petition

for adoption, but

approximately six months later and two months after he knew of
the birth of the child.
In K.Q., the court held that the natural grandmother who had
raised and cared for her grandchild for a period of more than 6
years since birth, was entitled to notice of the subject adoption
proceeding and to be heard regarding her fitness.

In the subject

case appellant has been involved in no such care and raising of
his child.

Further, despite his statement that he was involved

in a love affair with the natural mother for 8 months and had a
strong bonded relationship with her which he intended to resume
upon his return to the United States, for 13 months he had no
contact with the natural mother, neither did he provide her with
his address, phone number or any way

to contact him.

In

addition, he fathered another child in Nigeria during his absence
and was newly married at the time of his return to the United
States.

(See Statement of Facts, page 4 and Exhibit

"A",

paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 appellant's brief; also TAB 2 ) .
The comments of the trial court based upon the totality of
these circumstances, are very perceptive: "... if you open this
one up, our

statute

is absolutely

m e a n i n g l e s s , would be

meaningless altogether..." (p.5, TAB 3 ) . The trial court did not
err in refusing to grant appellant an evidentiary hearing.

13

POINT II
APPELLANT HAS NO EQUITABLE RIGHT T(f) HIS CHILD WHICH
TRANSCENDS THE STATES' INTEREST IN SPEEDILY IDENTIFYING
ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SECURELY CONCLUDING ADOPTIONS.
After examining the fundamental rights o|f parents to sustain
a relationship with their children, the Court stated In Re J.P.,
648 P2d 1364, 1374-75 (Utah 1982):
"...Parents in different circumstanjces are apparently
entitled to different degrees of protection for
their parental rights. Parental rights are at their
apex for parents who are married. Some variation
exists among unwed fathers. While those who have
fulfilled a parental role over a considerable
period of time are entitled to a high degree of
protection, unwed fathers whose relationships to
their children are merely biologicajl or very
attenuated may, in some circumstancjes, be deprived
of their parental status merely on the basis of a
finding of the 'best interest1 of tpe child..."
The United States Supreme Court in f:he case of Lehr v
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) likewise applied a rationale of
variable parental rights where it referred to the rights of the
parents as a counterpart of the responsibilities they have
assumed.

In its opinion, the Court elaborated that statement in

reference to an unwed father who had no custodial, personal or
financial relationship with the infant involved in that case.
" When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward
to participate in the rearing of his child, his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the due process of the law
...But the mere existence of a biological link does
not merit equivalent constitutiona|l protection" Id. at
261.

14

Justice Oaks, speaking for a unanimous court in Wells, 681
P2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984), described the legitimate and compelling
interest of the state as it relates to unwed fathers:
"...The State has a strong interest in speedily
identifying those persons who assume the parental
role over such children not just to assure immediate
and continued physical care, but also to facilitate
early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its
parents. The state must, therefore, have legal means
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether
the biological parents (or either of them) are going
to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their
corresponding responsibilities or whether adoptive
parents must be substituted."
The court further emphasized the compelling state interest
in adoption cases:
11

...If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of
being torn from parents with whom they have begun
the process of bonding and if prospective parents
are to rely on the process in making themselves
available for adoptions, such determinations,
must also be final and irrevocable." Id at 206-07.
Recognizing the significant and important interest of the
State in placing children swiftly and securely for adoption our
Supreme Court, in rejecting the claim of a mother to recover her
child 8 months after she had given it up for adoption, stated:
"It is and should be a policy of the law to so operate
as to encourage the finding of suitable homes and
parents for children in that need. It is obvious
that persons who might be willing to accept a child
for adoption would be more reluctant to do so if a
consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change
her mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate
the plan of the adoptive parents and bring to naught
all of their time, effort and expense and emotional

15

involvement... A moment's reflection will reveal that
to the degree that such commitments are given respect
and solidarity, so they can be relied upon, persons
desiring children will be willing to accept and give
them h o m e s .
Conversely, to the degree that such
commitment can easily be withdrawn and the adoptive
plan thus destroyed, such persons will tend to be
discouraged from doing so." In Re Adoption of F, 488
P2d 130, 134 (Utah 1971)
While the above case involved a situation where the natural
mother sought to revoke her consent, the Court as noted in the
foregoing decisions, has clearly determined that in cases of
unwed fathers, their rights are least where they merely have a
biological link to the subject child.

The same reasoning applies

to them as it would to the mother in the case cited above.

The

adoptive parents must have the assurance that the statute does
contain a cut-off provision which will be honored by the courts
particularly where, as here, a single sexual act resulting in
conception occurred after which the appellant left the country
for a period

of more

than one year, during which time no

communication was had with the natural mother, neither did she
know of his whereabouts.

Further, no interest of any kind had

been expressed by the appellant even as regards the natural
mother as demonstrated by his complete lack of communication.
Subsequently, 13 months later, the appellant returned to the
United States and learned that his child had been born, however,
he delayed taking any steps to file the required Notice of

16

Paternity for approximately 2 months.

To allow him to open the

subject adoption file, have an evidentiary hearing and seek to
set aside the adoption entered into in good faith by the adoptive
parents and the subject child

nearly

two years ago

would

completely frustrate the adoption process, both for agencies and
persons placing children for adoption as well as for those
parents willing to come forward and provide homes for adoptive
children,

POINT III
THE BEST INTERESTS OF BABY BOY DOE WILL BE SERVED BY HIM
REMAINING WITH HIS ADOPTIVE PARENTS.
Appellant's contention that because he is a black Nigerian
and the natural mother is white, somehow the best interests of
the child will be better served by being returned to him than
remaining with the respondents as the adoptive parents, is
illogical and has no basis in fact.

Appellant, as the natural

father, has had absolutely no relationship with the child.
Neither has he participated in the rearing of said child although
he now expresses a desire to do so.

Conversely, the respondents

as the adoptive parents, immediately made themselves available
and provided a home for the child at the time it was required.
They did so because of their love for the child and their desire
to provide a good home, where appropriate nuturing, physical and

17

emotional could occur. They also acted in reliance upon the
consent given by the natural mother.

Appellant's objection to

the subject adoption was filed with counsel for the adoptive
parents on or about February 13, 1987, nearly three weeks after
the adoption had been finalized.

The adoptive parents are the

only parents this child has ever known.

The bonding which

commenced on or about July 20, 1986 has continued now for almost
two years. Clearly, the best interests of this child dictate
that he remain in the home of his adoptive parents.

POINT IV
78-30-14(7) U.C.A. DOES NOT EXPAND THE TIME SET FORTH IN 7830-4(3) U.C.A. TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY.
Appellant assjerts the rather novel argument that 78-30-14(7)
U.C.A. which provides that the petition for adoption shall not
be granted until the child has lived in the home of the adoptive
parents for 6 months, in some way expands the statutory cut-off
period of 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. beyond the time of filing
petition for adoption and up to a period of six months.

the

He then

attempts to justify his delay in filing the acknowledgement of
paternity due to mistaken advice which he received from someone,
that he had six months in which to file his acknowledgement of
paternity.

What the appellant thought or understood the law to

be is neither material nor relevant.

All of the cases which have

considered the statutory cut-off provisions bf 78-30-4(3) U.C.A.
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i.e. Ellis, Wells, Sanchez, and Baby Doe, have held the statute
constitutional.

None of those decisions or any other to the

knowledge of respondents' counsel, by either the Utah Court of
Appeals or the Utah Supreme

Court have ever mentioned,

or

considered 78-30-14(7) U.C.A. as expanding the statutory cut-off
time for an unwed father to file an acknowledgement of paternity
to six months.

CONCLUSION

To allow appellant to open the subject adoption file and
have an evidentiary hearing, would open a Pandora's box of
immeasurable proportions.
child,

the

subject

If, in fact, notice of the birth of a

adoption proceedings

or the

statutory

requirements were required, it would mean in a case such as this,
that anytime a "one night stand" occurred and the putative father
was unaware that the act of intercourse resulted in conception,
or unaware

of the adoption proceedings

or the

statutory

requirement, he could come back at any time, and disrupt and void
the adoption process that had occurred soon after the birth of
the child.

It is respectfully submitted that such an
19

interpretation of the statute was never contemplated by the
legislative framers.

Further, this case does not come within the

Ellis and Baby Doe exceptions in that it was not impossible for
appellant to file the required notice through no fault of his
own.

Finally, to allow someone as the appellant to have an

evidentiary hearing when he failed for two months to file an
Acknowledgement of Paternity after learning that he fathered a
child and the child had been placed for adoption some six months
earlier, would result in total chaos insofar as the adoption
processes of the State of Utah are concerned and would render the
adoption statutes unreliable and meaningless.
as applied
process.

78-30-4(3) U..C.A.

to the facts of this case does not violate due

The trial court correctly denied appellant's petition

to open the adoption file and have an evidentiary hearing.
decision^ of the trial court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj^ day of May, 1988.

TIM W. HEALY

^-^

Attorney for Rejspondents
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TIM W. HEALY
Attorney for Petitioners
86J 25th Street
Oyden, Utah
84401
Telephone: 621-2630
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, &TATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF

DEPOSITION & CONSENT
I'O ADOPTION

INFANT DOE aka
A Minor Child.

Cjivil No.

'fPtfr

Come now SHELLY D. BROPHY and heir hiisband, LARRY
BROPHY
and being first duly sworn upon their oath (depose and say:
1. That the deponents are married to each other and have
two children previously born as issue of that marriage,
2. That the parties have been separated at various poili»di.
during; the past three - four years and havjj lived apart ioi signii i
cant periods of that time.
3. That on or about the first part of October 1985, your
affiant, SHELLEY D. BROPHY, became involve d in a bliet re la L i oiibh i p
with a male person not her husband wi t.h whom she enyaqed in a
single act of sexual intercourse from whiclh act she conceived am
bore a child on the /jf
day of July, *<1986 in Ogdep Utah. The
natural father of said child is a Nigerian and left the United
States within a few days after said act of intercourse. Your
affiant, SHELLY D. BROPHY, has had no further contact with b.ml
person since October 1985, and does not know his present wh<>re abouts. Your affiant does not intend to marry the father ol sd'd
child and is presently married to yon r affiant, LARKY
HKOPIIY .
4. That your affiant, LARRY
BROPHY, admils and aclnuwlui.
that he is not the father of the aforesaid minor chiJri born
on the
/ Q day of July, 1986 in Ogden, Utah. However, inasmuch
as said child was born during the ma triage of Larry
Brophy to
Shelley D. Brophy your affiant undeistands that said child is

DEPOSITION & CONSENT
Page Two
according
presumed legitimate/to Utah law and he is, therefore, prepared
to consent to the adoption of said child as set iorth h e i e m a l U i .
5. To the knowledge of your uifiants herein, the petition' / o
for adoption have offered to adopt said child and to assume the
duty of supporting, nurturing, educating and caring for said child
agreeing that said child shall become their heir at law to share*
equally in their estate.
6. That the parties, youi air-ants herein, have specifically
expressed the desire not to know the names of the adoptive parents
and do hereby waive any rights which they possess to know their
names, addresses and all details concerning their backgrounds and
further declare that they have received some general information
about them and are satisfied to make the placement.herein without
further knowledge concerning them and that your affiants consent
to said child being lawfully placed in the care, custody and conttol
of petitioners for adoption,
7. That your affiants v£ully, freely and vol unta ri 1 y cons« ni
to the adoption of Infant Doe, the minor child, by the potitLoncis
herein and they hereby surrender and release any and all rights
which they now have or may have to the care, custody and contiol,
affections, services and earnings ol said child. That they are
aware of their legal rights in this matter and do hereby expressly
state their desire that the petitioners for adoption may proceed
to complete the adoption in a lawfuL manner.
8. That neither of your affiants are in the military S I M V U M I
of the United States of America nor serving with the armed forces
of any nation with which the United States may be allied and do noi
claim any rights or relief under the applicable laws pertaining
thereto.
9. That your affiants hereby waive notice ol the tune and
place of any hearing or trial in the above cause, consent to the
hearing or trial therof at any time convenient to the Court and
to the petitioners herein without any further notice to them and

DEPOSITION & CONSENT
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hereby join in said Petition and respectfully request that the
Petition for Adoption be granted,
10. That this consent to adoption is given freely without
compulsion, payment or promises from anyone and that the best
interest of all parties herein shall be served by this adoption
and that the undersigned are not currently under the influence of
medications, drugs or intoxicants or in any manner unable to
understand the importance and finality of this Consent to Adoption
that all rights have been fully explained to their satisfaction.
DATED this

v

day of July,1986.

f SHELLEY XT. BROPHY

V.

LARK£"A. BROPHY C

y^r^—

is

Signed in the Prese

DISTRICT JUDGE

'S / U . J

O

Jiud

W

J'
OAA'

J/

1

THE C O U R T :

Is this adoption

2

MR. HEALY:

Y e s , Your

3

M R . C/VT.VER:

ready?

Honoj.

Merlin C a l v e r . f o r the p e t i t i o n e r

in

4

this m a t t e r , Your H o n o r .

5

b r i e f s , which

6

we're asking the Court to do is to have an

7

h e a r i n g regarding the placement

8

B a s i c a l l y , what we * re asking is baseld upon the f a c t s , the

9

natural

We both

I think basically

father was unaware

submitted memorandums

covef' all ih*3 i s s u e s .

of tne baby

in this m a t t e r .

that there w a s , in fact, a child.

He was out of the country

11

t h e r e f o r e , he could not have protected

12

known.

13

aware that he was a fnthnr, he thought- 1^ had

14

the statutory

15

months

16

before the adoption was
THE C O U R T :

20
21
22

his rights had
and

he

becoming

fllrd

within

six

filed before the six months

i\v

final.

N o w , his u n d e r s t a n d i n g

is not

the

The q u e s t i o n , basically ,| is w h e t h e r or not he had

a reasonable
MRopportunity3

opportunity.
C/VLVER:

He did not have a reasonable

Your H o n o r .

THE C O U R T :

According to Ithe letter

23 J natural m o t h e r , he was back

in the United
I
24 | couple of months before he did a n y t h i n g .
25 I

t i m e , and

His u n d e r s t a n d i n g was he had

from p l a c e m e n t , and he

18 -question.
19

during anyl statutory

And upon his returning to the country

17

What

evidentiary

10

time.

and

MR. CALVER:

from the

Htaten

for a

I t h i n k , t h o u g h , that the real

LSPUP

at the time of the placement , even though —
Mr. Healy would argup either way.

I think that

If I werp to say, well,

immediately upon his return to the country, he filed for
acknowledgement of paternity, Mr. Healy would then state,
well, that was too late, also, because he filed after thp
child was placed and after the petition was filed.

And the

Court in a couple of cases I've submitted, said that if the
father was not aware and did not have an opportunity to fjle
the acknowledgement of paternity, that an evidentiary hearinp
may be appropriate, and that?s what we're asking for is an
evidentiary hearing.
THE COURT:

How long after he arrived back in the'

United States did he file?
MR. CALVRR:
months.

it would have been approximately two

And these are the kinds of things that I think

should be brought before thp Court, but I'll proffer, the
natural father is not an American citizen.
of the American judicial process.

He was not awnm

He was informed by

someone, not an attorney, that he had six months.
wanted to confirm that the child was his.

He

He wanted to have

some time to consult his family in Nigeria regarding what
their desires were regarding the child.
an extended family system.

The Nigerians have

H^ had to consult with his

father and his mothpr to get their opinion.

As soon as hp

got their opinion on what they felt he should do, he filed

2

t

within the six month period.

And I truthfully think that

2

any time he would have filed after the placement, he would

3

have fallen under some of these Supreme Court cases.

4

they also say he has a right to due process.

5

aware of the child —

6

was not aware of the child at the time that the father left

7

the country.

8

for quite some time.

9

attempted to contact the father, and he was out of the

But

If he was not

and I can proffer, also, the mother

The mother was not awarfe that she was pregnant
And as soon as she found out, she

I think itfs a

10

country, and she had no way to contact him.

11

proper matter for an evidentiary hearing, and that's what

12

we!d like to ask.

13

MR. HEALY:

f
Your Honor, in response, we ve submit!r

14

^another lengthy statement of facts arid briefs, and I think

15

the Court can clearly see from the cases that have been

16

cited, that the only time our Supreme Court, and subsequently

17

the Court of Appeals, has allowed an|evidentiary hearing,

18

have been in those cases where it appears that due process

19

as applied may have bppn violated.

20

are exceptions to that rule that arel cited there are Baby

21

Doe and Baby Ellis.

22

totally different than the one beforje the Court now.

23

In the two cases that

Those are both (circumstances that are
Thosp

acknowledgements were filed within a day or two after the

24

matter came to the attention of the jpunitLve father.

The

25

other significant thing is those weije ongoing, long-term

1

r e l a t i o n s h i p s , where m a r r i a g e had been discussed

2

i n s t a n c e , and where there had been some ongoing period

3 J a period

of

in

each

many m o n t h s , where there had been those

for

regular

4

and daily

contacts.

5

expressed

h e r e , Your H o n o r , is that n u m b e r o n e , this did

6

occur i m m e d i a t e l y .

7

with his f a m i l y , to talk to different

8

should

9

N i g e r i a n , but he also has attended

10

I think the great

He took a couple of m o n t h s to

I do s o m e t h i n g about this

certainly

11

into evidentiary

14

adoption,thfese

15

deposition

16

single act of intprcoursp

17

adoption p r o c e s s e s .

18

say, w e l l , g e e , I just didn't

19

Court has s a i d , and as the United

20

said, actual notice

21

particular

hearings

Weber State C o l l e g e , and
and

customs.

this type of a s i t u a t i o n to
and

to o v e r t u r n p l a c e m e n t s

one-night, stands

and consent

—

which

is clear

if

grow
Vov

from

the

of the n a t u r a l m o t h e r , it was a
—

People

would
could

clearly

jeopardize

our

come back at any time

know.

And as our

States

is not a requirement

Supreme

and

Supreme
Court

to be met

has

in this

circumstance.
I would

submit

first of a l l , this

24 J Doe e x c e p t i o n s , and
25

consult

The other t h i n g , Your H o n o r , is the fact that

13

not

He may be a

is not naive as to U . S . m a t t e r s

thp Court were to permit

23

been

p e o p l e , to d e c i d e ,

child.

12

22 I

concern that has

for that r e a s o n , Your H o n o r , that

casp does not

fall within

s e c o n d l y , any time

the Ellis

and

that did o c c u r ,

far

exceeded what would havp b e e n a reasonable

opportunity.

Mr. Calver said they must have an opportunity.
said they must have a reasonable opportunity.

The Court
I submit that

waitinp; two months In mnkn nurh n dollorminnt ion \r

fnr 1 on

long.
THE COURT:

I've read your briefs in this thing,

and my opinion, if you open this one up, our statute is
absolutely meaningless5 would be meaningless altogether.
think itfs finalized5 and itfs a standard one.
reasonable opportunity for two months.

I

He had

I do not think it-

would go for hearing, and I reject jJour petition.
MR. CALVER:

Your Honor, c[<ould we have a written

decision on that for our files?

We would attempt to appeal

that decision, and I would need something.
THE COURT:
MR, CALVER:
THE COURT:

It's on the record.
Thank you.
There will be a minute entry.

also a record over here.
MR. HEALY:

There's

There's also your briefs.

Thank you.

.Transcript of Hearing held October 2, 1987
Reported
pv^j. e c u by:
uy .

,

Vicki L. Godfrey
Official Court Reporter'
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ADOPTION

THE ADOPTION CONUNDRUM
PART I
Professor Lynn D. Wardle1
Contested child custody cases often present courts with exquisite
dilemmas. None are more poignant than contested adoption cases.
Two recent controversial decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
highlight the adoption conundrum. In In re Adoption of Baby Doe,
111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) the court probably reached the right result
for the wrong reasons. In In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (1986) the
court probably reached the wrong result for the right reasons. Yet,
both decisions may help to prevent future abuses and to preserve the
fine balance of Utah's adoption law.
In this article the Baby Boy Doe decision will be reviewed. In the
next issue of Utah Lawyer Alert the Halloway decision will be
assessed.
The Baby Boy Doe Decision.
In In re adoption of Baby Boy Doe,2 the Supreme Court of Utah,
in a 3-2 decision, reversed the judgment of a Utah district court denying a motion filed by an unwed father to vacate an adoption petition respecting his child. The man (A.) and the girlfriend (S.H.) had
lived together out of wedlock in California for three and a half
years. In June, 1984, when she was apparently six or seven months
pregnant, S.H. left A. and moved to Utah to live with relatives, who
discouraged her from having further contact with A. Nevertheless,
S.H. continued to talk with A. by telephone and, in early August, a
few weeks before the child was born, A. visited her in Utah for
several days. She told him that she was considering adoption; he told
her that he opposed adoption and wanted to rear the child. S.H.
ostensibly agreed to resume living with A. and he went to Arizona to
look for a job and for a place for them to live. On August 24, A.
telephoned S.H. from Arizona to advise her that he had secured a
job and a place to stay, and that he would return to California to
pick up their belongings and move them to Arizona. The next day,
S.H. gave birth to the Baby Boy Doe in Utah, at least a week
prematurely.
Two days later, on August 27, S.H. appeared in court and formally relinquished her parental rights and consented to the adoption of
Baby Boy Doe\ S.H.'s sister-in-law had made arrangements for the
baby to be adopted by an Oregon couple, whose relatives, the Burns,
lived in Utah. The Burns filed an adoption petition in Utah in their
own names the same day that S.H. relinquished her parental rights
and were awarded temporary custody. The Oregon couple came to
Utah and took custody of the child from the Burns the next day,
August 28th, and three days later they returned to Oregon with Baby
Boy Doe.
Mr. A. attempted to contact S.H. from Arizona by telephone on
August 27, but was thwarted by her relatives. He learned of the
adoption on August 28. Thereupon he immediately contacted a
lawyer and drove to Utah. He filed a notice of claim of paternity on
August 29 and filed his motion to vacate the adoption petition on
September 6.
Utah Code Annotated §78-30-4(3) requires the father of a child
born out of wedlock who wishes to claim parental rights and receive
notice of adoption to file a notice of claim of paternity before a petition for adoption is filed. Mr. A. did not file his notice until two
days after the filing of the adoption petition. The district court
found that it was not impossible for appellant to have filed his notice
of claim of paternity before the petition of adoption was filed, and
that he had reasonable opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the
district court rejected Mr. A's claim to parental rights and denied his
motion to vacate the adoption petition.

the majority, alnalyzed two issues on appeal. The first issue was
whether the district court erred in rejecting Mr. A's allegation that
the adoption petition was fraudulent because the Burns only intended to adopt the child if their out-of-state relatives did not adopt the
child, and they gave the child to the out-of-state relatives less than 24
hours after getting temporary custody. The Supreme Court of Utah
noted that the district court had extensively explored this point, personally questioning the parties at the hearing, and had made an explicit finding of fact that the Burns had a good faith (if conditional)
intention to adopt the child when they filed the adoption petition.
The supreme court approved the trial court's analysis, emphasizing
that "this determination was one which was particularly within the
province of the fact finder".3
The second issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the
lower court erred in holding that Mr. A. was not denied due process
of law because he had a "reasonable opportunity" to comply with
the notice filing requirements of the Utah statute, and that it was not
"impossible" for him to do so. The court reviewed the landmark
decision in Elks v. Social Services Department of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.4 In that case the Utah Supreme
Court upheld Section 78-30-4(3) as facially constitutional, but stated
that if it was impossible for an unwed father to file the required
notice within the statutory period of time, "through no fault of his
own[,]. . . due process requires that he be permitted to show that he
was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
statute." 5 The court in Baby Boy Doe also stressed that "where a
father does not know of the need to protect his rights, there is no
'reasonable opportunity' to assert or protect parental rights." 6 And
while "actual notice is not required prior to termination of parental
rights of an uijwed father under section 78-30-4(3)," this genet al rule
only applies "where the putative father knows or should know of the
birth and can Reasonably take the timely action required to avoid the
statutory bar. r The totality of circumstances in Jhe BabxJB_oyJ?oe
case, rather than any single factor,_BeJ^iiadedJLhejmajprityJhat Mr.
&.' diTlioTTiaivjjiJ^
to comply with the
statute in this case, and that it was "impossible^ for him to do so.
The circumstances specifically noted by the court included "the
clearly articulkted intent of the father to keep and rear the child, the
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all involved, the
representations made by the mother, the actions of her family, the
premature birth, and the non-residency of the father coupled with
his absence at the time of birth . . . . "8
Justice Stewart wrote a strong dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Howe. The dissent was primarily concerned about the suggestion in the majority opinion that in some cases actual notice of
adoption might need to be given to the illegitimate father. In Ellis the
court had emphasized that the "impossibility" that was the basis for
the Ellis exception was only that the father "could not reasonably
have expected his baby to be born in Utah." 9 Inasmuch as Mr. A.
knew long before the child was born that it would be born in Utah,
he did not come within the Ellis exception. The due process analysis
of the majority was contrasted with that used by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Lehr v. Robertson,10 in which application ol a
very similar New York statute to terminate the parental rights of an
unwed fatherL whose efforts to establish a parental relationship with
his child had been thwarted by the deliberate acts of the child's
mother, was upheld. The dissent also emphasized that the majority
decision effectively overruled the trial court's findings of fact that
"[i]t was not impossible for Mr. Aguilar to have filed his Notice of
Claim prior to the filing of the adoption petition . . . " and that he
had "a reasonable opportunity to file the Notice of Claim before the
petition to adopt was filed." n Finally, as a policy matter, the dissent
emphasized that the majority ruling made "the validity of many
adoption proceedings turn on the majority's notion of 'fairness'
which woulcj create unpredictability" in many adoptions.
The Adoption Proceedings in Baby Boy Doe were
Statutorily I Defective.
The Utah Supreme Court unfortunately overlooked some serious
nonconstitutional deficiencies in the Baby Boy Doe case. The adoption procedures utilized by the parties to effect an out-of- state child
placement for adoption clearly violated the express statutory reVolume 87 No. 4

qmrement of both Utah and Oregon for inter-state adoptions Utah
md Oregon, and approximately 40 others states, are parties to the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 12 Under the
I C P C , any "person, corporation, association
or other entity
which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to
mother party state" is deemed to be a "sending agency" ,3 The Burns
Jcarly were a "sending agency' under the Compact Article III of
I C P C expressly prohibits any sending agency to 'send, bring, or
iiuse to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for
phcement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption '
unless all of the requirements of the compact are satisfied Among
the requirements are that the appropriate public authorities in the
receiving state be given written notice of the intent to bring the child
to the state, that those authorities investigate the prospective adoptive parents, and that those authorities notify the responsible agency
in the sending state 'that the proposed adoption does not appear to
he contrary to the interests of the child ' Id It does not appear that
my of the basic requirements of the I C P C for an interstate adoption were satisfied in this case
I he overwhelming weight of authority holds that the requirements
of the I C P C apply to private adoptions, as well as adoptions
through licensed agencies u A 1979 opinion from the Utah Attorney
General unequivocally advised the Division of Family Services that
the I C P C applies to private placements 15 Numerous official
Secretariat Opinions of the I C P C Compact Administrator have
held that the Compact applies to private placements 16 In In re
\doption ofTMM
,17 the Montana Supreme Court ordered a child
removed from the home of its prospective adoptive parents in Montana and returned to its biological mother in Mississippi because the
requirements of the I C P C had not been observed ,8 Thus, the
procedure employed by the parties in this case to effect a private interstate placement for adoption violated the I C P C ,9
Another nonconstitutional problem with the adoption in Baby
Boy Doe that was overlooked or ignored by the Utah Supreme Court
uas the conditional nature of the petition for adoption that was filed
b\ the Burns Their intent, apparently, was to adopt Baby Boy Doe
only if their out-of-state relatives did not adopt him as arranged The
Supreme Court of Utah could easily have interpreted §78-30 4(3) to
tut off the time for filing a notice of claim of paternity only if the
ndoption petition is filed by the actual, ultimate adopting parents,
not a conditional intermediary In fact, in light of the legislative
Hhcme embodied in that section, that is the natural construction
Section 78 10 4(3) provides not one but two "cut off" points before
tthtch the putative father of a child born out of wedlock must file his
notice of claim of paternity If the child is released to a licensed
agency (an agency subject to strict professional scrutiny, regulation,
and legally to be act in a very professional manner) the cut-off date is
the date on which the mother relinquishes the child to the agency for
adoption On the other hand, if the adoption is to be a 'private'
adoption, not involving an agency, the cut off date is 'the filing of a
petition [for adoption] by a person with whom the mother has placed
the child for adoption /2° This language suggests that the legislative
intended to cut off the right of the unwed father to file a notice of
claim of paternitv in private adoptions when the couple actually
adopting the child files a petition
In Baby Boy Doe the Burns, who filed the adoption petition in
Utah, were acting as an intermediary, unlicensed, nonprofessional
child placement agency The Utah Supreme Court should have ruled
that the filing of the adoption petition by them did not constitute
"the filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child for adoption' inasmuch as the Burns turned the child
over to another couple for adoption less than 24 hours after filing
their adoption petition and getting custody The court did not have
to find the Burn's adoption petition was fraudulent or invalid to
hold that it did not operate to cut off Mr A 's right to file a notice of
claim of paternity, only that the petition was not filed by the person
with whom Baby Boy Doe was ultimately "placed
for adoption '
The "New" Due Process Anal}sis in Baby Boy Doe
The due process anaKsis in Babv Boy Doe is intriguing 21 The case
illustrates why the requirements of 'due process of law' cannot be

reduced to a mechanical formula Justice Durham's majority opinion in Baby Boy Doe demonstrates a special sensitivity to individual
fairness and practical justice Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion
reveals a remarkably perceptive understanding of the systemic principles of "due process of law ' Justice Stewart is concerned that hard
cases make for bad law Justice Durham is concerned that hard law
makes for bad cases
The majority opinion in Baby Boy Doe modifies the test for due
process of law established in prior Utah adoption cases The seminal
case, Ellis, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1980 That
case involved two residents of California, Mr Ellis and his fiance,
who were engaged to be married and were expecting a child In July,
just two weeks prior to their wedding, when the women was three or
four months pregnant, and Ellis knew of the pregnancy, the woman
termmated the engagement Five months later, just a few days
before the child was to be born, the woman secretly traveled to Utah
and arranged to place the child for adoption A few days later, on
December 15, the child was born On December 19 the mother relinquished the child to a licensed adoption agency Somehow, about
this time, Ellis discovered what the woman had done and where she
had gone He immediately contacted his attorney who apparently
contacted the Utah adoption agency by telephone on December 21
On January 2, he filed his Notice of Claim of Paternity, and two
days later he filed a complaint in Utah court seeking habeas corpus
The trial court dismissed his complaint on the ground that his failure
to file a timely notice of claim of paternity constituted a total negation of his parental rights
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed, declaring Tn the usual
case, the putative father would either know or reasonably should
know approximately when and where his child was born It is conceivable, however, that a situation may arise when it is impossible
for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the
statutory bar, through no fault of his own In such case due process
requires that he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a
reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute ' " Since both of
the parties were California residents, the woman left California just
prior to the birth of the child without advising the man where the
birth was to occur, and since she relinquished custody just four days
after birth, the court reversed and remanded to give the father an opportunity to show "that he could not reasonable have expected his
baby to be born in Utah w23 The court said that he should be deemed
to have complied with the statute if he could show that "he came
forward within a reasonable time after the baby's birth
' 24
Baby Boy Doe was quite a different case In Baby Boy Doe the
father knew "approximately when and where his child [would be]
born ' 25 Justice Durham's majority opinion carefully emphasized
the 'no fault of his own" factors S H had agreed to move to
Arizona with Mr A before the child was born, in reliance on her
agreement to live with him A went to Arizona, got a job, secured
housing, returned to California to gather their possessions and take
them to Arizona, etc , S H 's family to prevented Mr A from talk
ing with the mother the day that, unbeknownst to him, she released
the child for adoption, etc Justice Durham makes a convincing case,
that j4r_A__ieasonahly beliej^jiiai^SJfcLj^ould not releaselnelr -illegitimate_childJLojLadopJUon In that senseTrT was~^noJ^u3TaQus
own' that he was surprised to learn that she had released the child
for adoption only two days after it was born But it is questionable
whether this was really the focus of the "no fault of his own Ellis
test, the 'no fault" standard articulated in Ellis did not modify the
father's belief that compliance with the statutory requirements was
unnecessary, but the existence of conditions which made it impossible for him to comply with the statutory requirement of filing a timely notice of claim of paternity The Ellis court only held that a father
was entitled to an opportunity to show that "as a factual matter
he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in Utah
Justice Durham suggested a reformulation of the Ellis rule application of U C A §78-30-4(3) to terminate the parental rights of
the father of a child born out of wedlock does not violate due pro
cess 'where the putative father knows or should know of the birth
and can reasonably take the timely action required to avoid the
statutory bar "26 However, even applying that test in Baby Boy Doe
6
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it is not self evident that Mr A's failure to file was excusable, i
knew of the approximate time and place of the birth of the child, I
had personally visited the mother in Utah for several days before tl
birth of the child, and could have 'reasonably take[n] the timely a
tion' of filing a notice of claim of paternity then Justice Durha
again emphasized the reasonableness of the father's belief that I
would not need to file a notice of claim of paternity But this miss
the point, the issue is not whether the father's decision to ignore (<
to fail to inquire about) the requirement of filing a notice of claim i
paternity was reasonable, but whether the requirement that he tal
the timely action required is reasonable as applied to him That l
the 'reasonableness' modifies the requirement that the father fi
the notice before the cut off event, not his excuse for failure to cor
ply 27
After Ellis, the next Utah decision to discuss due process in ado,
tion cases was Wells v Children's Aid Society 2* In that case, a co
pie of Moab high school students had sex and the girl became pre
nant When the girl informed her boyfriend (Wells) of her probab
pregnancy he shunned her When the girl was about eight wee!
pregnant Wells was informed that the pregnancy was confirmed, ar
he finally told his parents Wells' parents offered financial suppo
to the pregnant girl and attempted to dissuade her from giving tl
child up for adoption They also contacted an attorney and weie n
formed that the putative father would need to file a notice of clan
of paternity However, Wells and his parents decided not to file tl
notice of claim of paternity because thev were not sure if the chii
was really his, they decided to wait to see when the child was bon
About a week before the child was to be born, the girl left Moab an
went to Ogden to have the child The baby was born on Septemb
23 Wells learned of the birth the same day, and immediately r
mailed in the notice of claim of paternity However, the notice di
not arrive until September 30 On September 24, the girl formall
relinquished her parental rights and placed the child with a license
agencv for adoption The next day the child was placed by the ager
cv for adoption, and two days later the Department of Health issue
a certificate of search verifying that no notice of claim of paternil
had been filed A week later, Wells brought an action seekin
custody of the child in alleging that the girl and the agency an
fraudulently concealed facts surrounding the infants birth to deprn
him of his parental rights The trial court held that the father wa
denied 'a reasonable opportunity to file" his notice of claim o
paternity and awarded him custody
The Supreme Court of Utah unanimously reversed The court em
phasized the concept of 'variable parental rights' which the Unite
States Supreme Court had established in Lehr v Robertson, l e
'the rights of the parent are a counterpart of the responsibilities the
have assumed 29 The court distinguished Ellis because
here the birth occurred in the same state as the father s
residence, and neither the child's mother nor the agency was
involved in any effort to prevent him from learning ot the
birth or from asserting his parental rights Neither the mother
nor the agency knew at the time the child was relinquished
that the father was seeking to or intending to assert his paren
tal rights
The father had sufficient opportunity to [file h«s
claim of paternity], including ample advance notice of the ex
pected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended to
relinquish the child for adoption, advice of co* isel
, and
> the copy of the form 30
' Ellis had extended the^lreasonable opportunity to comply withjbt
statute after the statutoxyjjjjng deadlines ]]ia3]passe3_ojily_in case;
\ 'when it isTirst shown that lFwas 'impossible' for the father to rili
^'throu^FTno faulFof his own ' ,3r ~Pernaps most importantly, trfl
court also held that a particularized, subjective standard of fairnes1
was not required by the due process clause because the statute on u«
face was sufficiently fair 'The legitimate state interests lr
facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoptior
proceedings completed expeditiously that underlie the entin
statutory scheme also justifv a trial judges' determination to requin
all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural re
32
quirements of the statute
Conceptually, the decision in Baby Boy Doe is at odds with the

principles articulated in Wells, which emphasized that individualized their claim to paternal rights. The apparent incompatability of the
"luimess^lvTironT^
two cases is underscored by the significant common facts: the
o\~ ''impossibility'^ and^'no fault of~his own" have been satisfied. putative fathers in both cases knew of the pregnancy, did not know
Factually, however, Baby Boy Doe can be distinguished from Wells that the law required them to file a notice of claim of paternity until
because the father and mother were Utah residents, no effort was it was too late, both men showed an interest in raising the child and
made to prevent the father from learning of the birth or asserting expressed their desire to live with the mother and child, both fathers
parental rights, and the mother did not know at the time that she mistakenly believed that the mother would not give the child up for
released the child for adoption that the putative father intended to adoption, and both men acted promptly to assert parental rights as
assert his parental rights. Moreover, the putative father inWells had soon as they learned that the child had been placed for adoption. But
spoken to counsel before the birth of the child, knew specifically the the difference in results can be partially justified by several key facUtah legal requirements, and made a deliberate decision to postpone tual differences: in Sanchez the father and mother were residents of
the filing. Wells emphasizes that due process does not require the; Utah, the mother in Baby Boy Doe had agreed to resume living with
state to indefinitely protect the parental rights of fathers who ge-i the putative father, and the putative father was out of state seeking
nuinely wish to assert their parental responsibilities; the rights of J employment and housing in reliance upon that representation.
sincere unwe i fathers may be cut off if they fail to act in the prompt)
Probably the loosest language in the majority opinion in Baby
and timely manner required by the statute.
» Boy Doe is that suggesting that "where a father does not know of the
A month after Wells was decided, the Utah Supreme Court decid- need to protect his rights, there is no 'reasonable opportunity' to
ed Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services.33 In that case a woman, CSM, assert or protect parental rights." 36 Literally, this is an "actual
lived with a man, Sanchez, for four months and became pregnant by knowledge" standard-and since most fathers of illegitimate children
him. Sanchez proposed marriage, but CSM refused. Sanchez ex- probably do not have "actual knowledge" of the specific repressed the desire to have CSM and their baby live with him, but quirements of §78-30-4(3), literal application of that standard could
CSM told Sanchez that she was thinking of giving the baby up for create severely unjust uncertainty and confusion in adoption cases.
adoption. He did not protest the mother's decision to place the child However, this language does not stand alone. A little later in the
for adoption, but he said that he assumed that she would not. same paragraph Justice Durham clarified that actual notice was not
Together they discussed adoption with a counselor from an adoption required "where the putative father knows or should know of the
agency. The counselor did not inform Sanchez of his right to file a birth and can reasonably take the timely action required . . ,"37 It is
notice of claim of paternity. Approximately seven months after worth noting, that the United States Supreme Court, in Lehr, exTSM quit living with Sanchez she gave birth to the child. Three days pressly rejected the requirement that putative fathers of illegitimate
later, on October 27, she formally relinquished the child to the agen- children be actually notified of the requirements of the law:
;y for adoption. EarlieT that same day Sanche2 had visited her and
The possibility that (the father of an illegitimate child) failed
he baby at the hospital after CSM had called him to come "if you
to (comply with a statute requiring filing of a notice of claim
want to see the baby one last time." He tried to sign the birth cerof paternity) because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a
:ificate, but was not allowed to do so. That afternoon, after CSM
sufficient reason for criticizing the
law itself. The . . .
had relinquished the child for adoption, Sanchez attempted unsuclegislature concluded that a more open-ended notice requirecessfully to file his notice of claim of paternity; he succeeded in filing
ment would merely complicate the adoption process, threaten
lis claim the next day. Later Sanchez filed a petition for writ of
the privacy interests of unwed mothers, create the risks of unmbeas corpus to obtain custody of the child. The trial court dismissid the petition.
The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed by a vote of 3 to 1. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, emphasized Wells and distinguished Ellis on the basis that Sanchez lived in Utah throughout the
pregnancy, knew the time and place of the birth of the child, and
;ould fairly be presumed to know the law of his state of residence.34
The court emphasized the need for a clear and final "cut off" date to
)rotect the profound interests of the adoptive parents, the natural
nother, and the illegitimate child. "It is not too harsh to require that
hose responsible for bringing children into the world outside the
stablished institution of marriage should be required either to com>ly with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert
heir parental rights or to yield to the method established by society
o raise children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare
;
adoption]." 35
Justice Durham, alone, dissented and attempted to distinguish
Veils. She emphasized that Sanchez had consistently asserted his inerest in the child throughout the pregnancy, proposed marriage,
mbliely acknowledged paternity, filed his notice of claim of paterniy within hours of learning of the statutory requirement, and was not
a formed of her intent to release the child for adoption until it was
oo late for him to file his notice of claim of paternity. Interestingly,
u^tice Durham based her argument upon Article 1, section 7, of the
itah Constitution. She did not attempt to distinguish the United
laies Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of
he fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
c/ir; apparently she would have the Utah Supreme Court hold that
he due process clause of the Utah Constitution provides greater proirction to the parental rights of fathers of illegitimate children than
oes the United States Constitution. However, no other justice joind in her position.
The analysis of the majority in Baby Boy Doe is difficult to reconlle with the emphasis in Sanchez on the need for a "firm cut off
ale" for putative fathers of children born out of wedlock to assert

necessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of
adoption decrees
[W]e surely cannot characterize the
states' conclusion as arbitrary 38
Conclusion.
In the final analysis, Baby Boy Doe makes a positive contribution
to the fine balance of due process in terminating parental rights in
adoption proceedings in Utah It provides a healthy counterbalance
to Wells and Sanchez; in those cases the Utah Supreme Court
demonstrated that it was willing to strictly apply the requirements of
section 78-30-4(3) even if it meant that biological fathers who
sincerely wanted to raise their children would be deprived of that opportunity forever The importance of compliance with the adoption
statutes and the substantial risk that a dilatory unwed father runs
have clearly been emphasized Utah's serious commitment to protecting the important interests of unwed mothers, adoptive parents,
adopted children and to promptly insuring stability of adoptions
have been vindicated by those decisions Ellis and Baby Boy Doe
protect the competing interests and emphasize the importance of the
rights of biological fathers and the significance of potential families
They ensure that every putative father will be entitled to an
o p p o r t u n i t y - a t least a minimum period of time in which to inquire
and a c t - t o claim parental rights These cases stand for the proposition that the "reasonable" time which must be provided may, in exceptional cases, extend beyond the cut off time set in §78-30 4(3)
The question remaining, of course, is how can judges and attorneys tell when a case falls within the Ellis-Baby Boy Doe exception While that is not crystal clear now, there were four significant
factual circumstances in both Ellis and Baby Bov Doe that might be
expected in other exceptional cases First, there was deceit or
misconduct on the part of the mother or her agents at a critical time,
which prejudiced the ability of the putative father to comply with the
notice-filing requirement Second, in both cases the child was conceived out of Utah by non-Utah residents, and the mother came to
Utah just a short time before giving birth to the child (there are
choice-of-law and jurisdictional overtones here) Third, the putative

fathers registered their notice of claim of paternity immediately
upon learning of the statutory duty to do so Finally, such registration occurred within just a few days after the child was released for
adoption
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